In 2014, at the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia's aggression against this neighboring country, Lithuania became concerned about the strengthening of its military capabilities, augmenting the National Defense System (NDS) budget by almost 50% in two years. This may be considered unprecedented, if seen against the background of the presidential elections and those to the European Parliament, the fiscal discipline, the introduction of euro, as well as Russia's economic sanctions, the political decision in the course of 2014 on increasing the defense assignation by 130 million litas and in 2015 the increase by planned additional 356 million litas. This article analyzes two closely related problems of the Lithuanian NDS capabilities. First of all, changes in the NDS financing are explored in the context of permanent agreements of Lithuanian political parties concerning the allocation of 2% of the GDP for defense. This is followed by the discussion of the issues of military personnel staffing and training of the reserve as well as future challenges. This research contributes to the assessment of the critical NDS financing and staffing not only within academic circles but particularly among politicians and society in general. Additionally, it contributes to the awareness of the problems the army encountered in seeking to implement the objective set for it: to ensure the military security of the state. In the presence of the emerging threats in the region, this is of particularly great significance to the demilitarized and pacifist society of Lithuania. The article aims at identifying financing and personnel planning problems throughout a quarter of the century, ranging from the restoration of the Army of the Republic of Lithuania to 2014 inclusively. At the same time, the study encourages a discussion by the academic community on issues of the military security of the Lithuanian State and provides analyses as well as possible development scenarios.
Introduction
It is too early to assess the significance of Russia's 2014 aggression towards Ukraine and its long-term effects; a temporal distance is necessary for that. Yet, this year seems to have been the turning point in the Lithuanian defense policy when serious consideration has been given to the NDS and the threat of an armed conflict has increased 1 . However, it should be stated that attitudes to the security of the state vary. There are people that think that the army in Lithuania should be almost abolished. The conviction or speculations that, in spite of actions and efforts of Lithuania and other Baltic States, other NATO countries, particularly the USA, should inevitably defend and will defend the countries in question since in the opposite case, the USA would be threatened with a decrease in the global power, decline in the prestige, etc. shape the attitudes of a part of society as well as politicians that NATO "will defend us" and what's more the EU "will give us money". For example, Zenonas Norkus, in his book published in 2014, states that "in fact, NATO countries have a moral duty to defend and safeguard Lithuania without remuneration for at least 100 years, thus at least partly compensating the damage that the leaders of the largest Western countries caused our country by concluding the Yalta agreement with J. Stalin" 2 . Besides, in the author's words, "present-day Lithuania could completely renounce Regular Army (with the exception of professional military units for missions abroad) and, following the model of post-war partisans, entrust the defense of the country to organized and trained in partisan tactics territorial units of patriots volunteers" 3 . In 2004, Lithuania became a member of the EU and NATO, seemingly with the hope of comfortably and securely "riding for free", receiving financial support from the EU and security guarantees from NATO allies. The situation of Lithuania, a country the activity of which is clearly characterized by features of a dependent, is made more complicated by the fact that out of 28 NATO countries only 6 are not EU members and vice versa, out of 28 EU countries 6 are not NATO members either, whereas the remaining 22 states, among them Lithuania, are members of both blocs. Therefore, the policy of the extended hand is destined to be noticed, despite varied attempts to disguise the exceptionally consumerist attitude towards NATO and the EU. Constant promotion of the issue that Lithuania "should get something" inevitably produces an echo in other countries that "have to give something"; besides, both security and economic support are also money of tax payers (voters) but not those of Lithuania. Lithuania, as a country facing grave military threats regarding national security, assigns for the defense actually the least money from all NATO countries, with the exception of Luxemburg (Iceland de jure has no military capabilities). Meanwhile, the average defense expenditure of European NATO countries during the recent 5 years is about 1.6-1.7% of the GDP and taken together with the USA and Canada amounts to approximately 2.9-3.3% of the GDP. Let us compare: the Estonian expenditure for defense from 2005 to 2013 increased by more than twofold: from 204 million USA dollars to 479 million USA dollars whereas Lithuania's expenditure increased only by 16 .07%, i.e. from 305 million to 354 million USA dollars. Thus, Estonia is one of the three NATO countries in Europe, alongside Greece and Great Britain that allocates not less than 2% of the GDP for defense. France and Poland are almost at the agreed margin and allocate 1.9% of the GDP for defense each 4 . However, speeches and some decisions of the politicians of the first half of 2014 enable the assumption that the urging of NATO allies and particularly USA representatives to increase assignations for the NDS and enhance national military capabilities have been taken heed of. Even in seeking to introduce the euro, thus making huge efforts not to increase the deficit, already in 2014 a political decision was taken to increase the NDS budget by 130 million litas (from 980 million litas to 1 110 million litas; in compliance with the official fixed ratio 1 Euro is equal to 3.4528 litas), the requirement for financing defense for 2015 was identified as 1 380.8 million litas (1.03% of the GDP). A number of plans, though publicly not detailed, pertaining to actions to be taken for the enhancement of defense in the future were published. In making development plans for military capabilities, it is important to analyze the current situation and consider possible future perspectives. Therefore, on the grounds of publicly available information, the author will analyze in this article problems of NDS financing and staffing as well as feasible perspectives.
Financing of the National Defense System
Financing is the essential factor in planning the development of military capabilities, foreseeing the structure of the forces, determining the margin numbers of the personnel strength, planning the procurement of armament systems and other assets. After the restoration of the State of Lithuania and the army, it was impossible, due to the economic recession, to allocate a large portion of the GDP for defense, but it is safe to say that consideration for the necessity to increase NDS financing has been permanently manifested. In 1993-1997, the NDS was allocated from 0.48 to 0.8% of the GDP. Increase in the financing was initiated in 1997 when the NDS was allocated 325.6 million litas in comparison to 177.8 million litas in 1996
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. But the breakthrough came in 1998 with the assignation of 1.3% of the GDP 6 . That year the Government planned to allocate the NDS 462.165 million litas and also granted the permission to take out a loan of 152.9 million litas 7 . In 1998, Vice-Minister Jonas Kronkaitis rejoiced after the meeting with the USA military delegation that the colleagues from beyond the Atlantic had favorably assessed Lithuanian NDS financing changes since, in his words, in 1994-1995 only 0.5-0.6% of the GDP was allocated whereas in 2000 it was planned to reach the level of 2% of the GDP . In essence, until 2004, the portion of the GDP for the NDS kept increasing or was stable-1.3-1.4% of the GDP with the exception of the decline to 1.04% of the GDP in1999 11 . In drawing up the 1999 budget, the NDS was to be allocated 573.6 million litas
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; in the course of the year, the assignation was first reduced by about 98 million litas 13 tion of the GDP for defense but in fact cut the NDS budget from 859.7 million litas to 843 million litas. Though in subsequent years (until 2008) the amount of assignations for the NDS kept increasing and in the above-mentioned year set the "record"-1 246.8 million litas-the percentage portion of the GDP kept consistently decreasing to 0.77% in 2013 when it hit the "bottom", whereas the growth in 2014 in comparison with previous years was only 0.01% of the GDP 16 .The portion of the state budget assigned to the NDS also shows a tendency to decrease: in 2000 the allocation was 7.7% of the budget, in 2001 decided to propose that the Government increase NDS assignations annually and eventually reach 2% of the GDP. The MND aimed at increasing the financing by not less than an annual 0.05% of the GDP in order to make it possible to minimally carry out international commitments taken on by Lithuania and to settle national missions 19 . In 2008, Minister of National Defense Juozas Olekas pointed out that it was necessary to increase the NDS financing for the following year of 2009 by 0.05% of the GDP and approach 2% because, as the politician admitted "it is about the financing that Lithuania receives reproaches from NATO" 20 . However, during the hard times, the financing of combat training had been reduced by 60% and to restore "its sufficient level" greater financing was needed. In the same year, on 16 January 2013, at the meeting with members of the National Security and Defense Committee (NSDC) held at the MND, it was emphasized that in 2004 and 2012 political parties agreed to increase assignations for defense to 2% and NDS financing was presented. It was pointed out that the MND requirement in 2014 was 1 178.2 million litas and in 2015 it was 1 296.1 million litas; thus, the former financing would be restored 24 . However, not a single agreement from the afore-mentioned has been implemented ( Figure 1) .
Certainly, the cuts in the assignations for the MND could be justified by hard times for the economy but, having compared budget assignations of the Lithuanian State for the ministries in 2008 and in 2013 it becomes clear that the financing of all of them, except the MND, Ministry of Finance (MF) and Ministry of Economy (ME) increased. Though reduced, billion-strong assignations of the MF are associated with servicing the state debt and a part of ME functions were transferred to the Ministry of Energy which is allocated over half a billion litas 25 ; thus, it was only the MND that was bypassed in restoring assignations in spite of politicians agreements to increase defense financing to 2% of the GDP. In March 2014, the political parties of Lithuania once again agreed to increase NDS financing until 2020 to 2%. Being aware that in 2013 Lithuania's GDP was 119.469 billion litas and optimistically hoping that the growth of the GDP until 2020 will remain at least 2%, one could predict that in six years the GDP will increase to approximately 148 billion litas or to 42.867 billion euros (Table 1) , on average only about 1% of the GDP. If, starting from 2004, Lithuania's governments had followed the permanent internal political agreement as well as the commitment to NATO allies and allocated 2% of the GDP for defense, then during 10 years of the membership in the Alliance of collective security (2004-2013) the NDS would have additionally received about 9.6 billion litas, i.e. two times more than it was actually allocated. Consequently, the amount saved at the expense of defense and channeled to other areas in the context of Lithuania was enormous and this is a serious argument for the public in substantiating the increase of assignations for the NDS in the future.
It is expedient to make up a long-term NDS development plan-within the perspective of 10 years (or two presidential terms in office) (2015-2024)-particularly being aware of the fact that Russia has set the objective in 2016-2025 to create forces capable of executing operations against any adversary (including NATO, the USA) on the basis of new military planning principles 29 .
Following the above-mentioned agreement of 2014 30 and planning defense for a longer period, NDS expenditure for 2015-2024 could make up 7.317 billion euros (25.263 billion litas) and by allocating 25% of the mentioned amount for procurement, it would be possible to develop a stable long-term plan for strengthening defense material capabilities translating into 1.829 billion euros (6.315billion litas). The other portion of the assignations, about 5.488 billion Euros (18.948 billion litas), could be allocated to maintaining personnel and capabilities and developing the necessary infrastructure. Consequently, within the coming 10 years, defense could be allocated 2.6 times more than during the first decade of the membership in NATO and even considerably more than it had been allocated during the first 24 years of the restored statehood of the Republic of Lithuania (preliminary in 1994-2014 about 14.77 billion litas under the prices of the current year 31 ). An increase in financing to the discussed extent would enable the establishment of a completely different, as far as quality and quantity are concerned, Lithuanian Armed Forces. In 2014, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania prepared and submitted to the Seimas an optimistically disposing budget project in which the planned assignations for the NDS in 2015 are about 1.11% of the GDP, i.e. 424.611 million euros (1 466.1 million litas). In addition to that, it is planned to allocate 49.6% for maintaining personnel and 27.1% for procurement and armaments from the total means allocated to the NDS with NATO standards for personnel being up to 50% and for procurement and armaments not less than 20% of the assignations 32 . * The estimation has been made on the basis of the published requirement for NDS in 2015 and indicates that it would make up 1.03% of the GDP assuming that Lithuania's GDP will increase by 2% annually. ** In 2014, the MND budget was 980.5 million litas (according to forecasts by the MF of the RL it constitutes 0.78 % of the GDP); it is planned to additionally allocate 130 million litas and the GDP would consequently increase to 0.88 %. *** The published MND requirement was 1 380.8 million litas though the planned assignations in the budget project submitted to the Seimas were higher by 85.3 million litas -424.611 million euros (1.11 % of the GDP).
According to Edward Lucas, an expert on Central and Eastern Europe economy and policy, "the objective to allocate 2% of the GDP for defense of the country is based not on the aspiration to be able to defend independently. As much as 100% of the GDP would not be sufficient for that. The aim of this expenditure is to demonstrate to the allies that Lithuania treats its security seriously -both by contributing to international missions abroad and by being a serious defendable ally. <...> Once a USA official said to me [to E. Lucas -V. J.], 'We are requested, because of these people, to risk World War III. They had better make efforts to show that they are worthy of being defended' . This may sound radical, but it is true. <...> It would be difficult to understand why NATO members, spending for security less than the minimum promised to the Alliance, should endlessly abuse the determination of other countries to defend them at the time of war" 33 . Essentially, it is the USA capabilities and investments that the military power of NATO is based on; defense expenditure of this country equals the common expenditure for defense of several other large world powers. Annually, the USA spends amounts for defense that are inconceivable by Lithuania's scale-over 600 billion US dollars (it is the entire budget of the size of 2014 of the Lithuanian State for approximately 50-60 years); also in the long-term five year (2015-2019) perspective, the USA plans to allocate for defense about 2.9% of the GDP (or about 2 925 billion US dollars) 34 . The agreement to allocate 2% of the GDP for defense can be substantiated in various ways: on the one hand, it allows to monitor whether a part of NATO allies reducing investments in defense do not abuse security provided by other countries; on the other hand, assignations of a fixed level would enable to maintain adequate-level military capabilities. Thus, 2% of the GDP for defense guarantees solidarity of NATO countries and retention of military power which is particularly urgent for Lithuania.
The above-mentioned facts reveal that: 1) record years in terms of the GDP portion for defense were 2002-2003-about 1.42% of the GDP; in terms of the allocated amount in 2007-2008, when one billion litas was exceeded; 2) over more than two decades, it is possible to discern at least three NDS financing periods: until 1997; 1998-2003 and after 2004. It was only during the second period that serious attempts were made to increase the GDP portion for defense in seeking the NATO standard, which is 2% of the GDP; 3) the reduction of the GDP portion for defense immediately after Lithuania became a member of NATO apparently indicates only occasional, political "concern" for defense in seeking to become members of the Alliance. In addition, in 2009-2010, MND budget cuts were drastic and disproportionate to the overall reduction of state budget expenditure; therefore, state financial problems had a much greater impact on the NDS than on the state in general. Moreover, no haste was in fact made to restore the financing, thus risking a loss of the allies' trust.
NSD personnel and reservists
A state is a community of people and its defense is the business of the people themselves. In 2010, the Chief of Defense of Lithuania Maj. Gen. Arvydas Pocius emphasized that "the army without society will not defend the country; consequently it is necessary to think about the training of citizens for defense, i.e. about the training of the mobilization reserve" 35 . In 2011, the State Defense Council approved of the conception of the armed defense on the basis of which "in case of a military conflict, Lithuania is ready to defend its country by using the services of the organized, rapidly mobilized reserve" 36 . Therefore, military training of the reservists is a particularly urgent issue in terms of safeguarding the national security. Until 2008, the Army of Lithuania had been manned by applying a mixed system, i.e. military personnel of both the Professional Military Service (PMS) and Compulsory Basic Military Service (CBMS) served in the Army (Table 2) .
For nearly two decades there was continual training of military reservists. In 1998, the Army had 8.5 thousand PMS servicemen and civilian employees and 3.5 thousand conscripts; therefore, in 1998, the number of conscripts was increased by 1 400. It was planned to augment it still more in the future and renounce the call up for young people to carry out military service in the regiments of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) . Thus, it is normal that, after the abolition of compulsory military service, the number of the trained reservists in Lithuania is decreasing. Transition to exclusively PMS was based on various arguments: professionalism, motivation, effectiveness, application of new technologies in warfare, etc. Yet, according to J. Olekas, one conscript cost about 11 thousand litas per year and a professional serviceman -35 thousand litas 46 . In 2012, it was estimated that in Lithuania one professional serviceman is to be allocated on average 53.9 thousand litas per year, not including exercises and training sessions. This amount comprises the salary, social insurance, allowances for food, accommodation and clothing. A major part of this amount, 67%, is allocated for salary and social insurance 47 . However, after compulsory military service was suspended, the Lithuanian army faced a shortage of soldiers. In 2010, it was planned to conclude only about 350 contracts with soldiers, and this was feasible only having cut the salaries of servicemen during the second year of 43 KAS personalo skaičiaus pokytis, http://www.kam.lt/lt/personalo_politika_512/skaiciai_ir_faktai_537. html, 14 02 2014. 44 Radvilas G., "Generolas Jonas Kronkaitis: Lietuva pajėgi apsiginti", Kardas, 2010, nr. 6 (447), p. 7. 45 "Krašto apsaugos ministrė Seimo Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komitetui pristatė parengtojo kariuomenės rezervo struktūrą", Krašto apsauga, 2012, nr. 4 (227), p. 1. 46 "Lietuvos gyventojai remia profesionaliosios kariuomenės modelį", Krašto apsauga, 2007, nr. 1 (113). p. 16. 47 Medutytė N., "Kiek kainuoja karys", http://www.balsas.lt/naujiena/549976/kiek-kainuoja-karys, 27 11 2014.
service from 1 575 litas to 1 530 litas (by 855 litas during the first year). Servicemen also receive food and accommodation allowances 48 . Searching for alternatives, training of reserve servicemen was started in a different, voluntary form and shortened. On 16 November 2009, in the Training Regiment in Rukla a 13-week compulsory military training (CMT) began 49 . In 2010, about 300 conscripts were trained, and in 2011 521 were trained, and in 2012 it was planned to train about 700 persons. At that time, Minister of National Defense Rasa Juknevičienė claimed that "of course, the army should have more, so that we could train the reserve properly, yet this is better than to do nothing" 54 . In 2014, maintaining of a PMS soldier cost of 56.1 thousand litas or 16.25 thousand euros (the salary, social insurance contributions, food allowance, clothing supply, social support of employees), whereas the planned annual expenditure for one military volun-teer in 2015 is 6.8 thousand litas (1970 euros) (salary, social insurance contributions, food allowance, clothing supply, social support of employees) 55 . Thus, maintaining a volunteer is 8.25 times cheaper than maintaining a professional serviceman; therefore, with reference to the territorial defense conception, it is reasonable to significantly increase the number of the active reserve volunteers of the NDVF since maintaining of all presently-serving 4.4 thousand volunteers in 2014 is the same as that of approximately 530 professional servicemen. Therefore, in the future, in increasing the number of NDS personnel, it would be expedient to balance the ratio of professional servicemen and volunteers by rapidly increasing the number of the latter.
It is important to point out that a rather large number of Lithuanian servicemen have been sent to study abroad or participated in international operations. Until the beginning of 1997, 303 employees of the NDS had studied in NATO countries 56 . In 1994-2007, more than 3000 Lithuanian servicemen took part in 13 international missions and operations; during the period of those 13 years, the largest number of servicemen, over 1 700, were deployed to missions in the Balkans 56 Budrys K., "Gen. Klausas Naumanas: "sąveika su NATO svarbiau už ginkluotę"", Karys, 1997, nr. 9, p. 8. 57 64 . This, of course, does not remain unnoticed and unappreciated by NATO allies.
Peacetime and Wartime Forces
In 1998, the number of posts in a standard MIB was approved, at 712 persons 65 . According to the posts approved in 2005, a mechanized infantry battalion had to comprise 650 servicemen; in the same year, the number of posts in a battalion was being changed, reducing it to 619-627 servicemen 66 .
In 1995, Chief of Joint Staff Col. Valdas Tutkus pointed out that "there are battalions where 260-460 personnel serve, nearly half of them in the supply service. It is better to have three or four battalions which are armed, equipped and ready to accomplish , than a dozen semi-battalions" 67 . 15 years later, at the end of the summer of 2009, Maj. Gen. Jonas Kronkaitis critically assessed the reform of the transition to the professional army, and claimed that "some battalions have practically been left without soldiers" 68 . In 2012, when assessing the security situation in the region and NDS financing, Lt. Gen A. Pocius stated: "I cannot criticize political decisions; as Chief of Defense I have to assign military personnel such tasks and arrange the priorities so that we could survive and preserve the army. It is essential to retain those commanding officers whose training has cost a lot. <…> It will be possible to increase the number of enlisted personnel later when the situation has improved. I hope that next year will be better and the financing will be better as well" 69 . On 2 January 2014, the renewed website of the MND read that 285 PMS personnel served in the King Mindaugas Hussar Battalion 70 which actually made up two companies. In September of 2014, the new Chief of Defense of Lithuania Maj. Gen. Vytautas Žukas, while speaking about 6 motorized and mechanized battalions of the Land Forces, stated that they "are very unevenly manned. There are battalions that are 17% manned, and there are such that have 60% of the required strength. To make these battalions operable, they must be at least 70-80% manned"
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. Thus, the above-mentioned facts reveal the problem identified by the two former Chiefs of Defense of Lithuania and the present one that the existing battalions do not always have sufficient personnel, although a lack of data does not allow us to carry out a more detailed analysis of the problem from aside.
According to the plans approved in 1998, the NDS personnel had to reach 23 thousand in 2008 and still later 48 thousand servicemen. Besides, about 100 thousand active reserve servicemen had to be trained 72 . In the NDS development guidelines for 2002-2005 that were approved in 2001, it was planned to increase NDS personnel by 5-6% annually, and in 2005, there had to be 18 220 persons, whereas the active reserve had to comprise up to 25 thousand servicemen, including 13 thousand volunteers 73 . However, comparing the army of 2000 with the army of 2009, according to Maj. Gen. J. Kronkaitis, the number of the staffs as well as the personnel serving in them increased, and a negative proportion between officers and non-commissioned officers to soldiers emerged; the army was downsized. In 2000, there were 11 thousand volunteers and 11 thousand regular army personnel, whereas at the end of the summer of 2009, there were only 4 thousand volunteers and 8 thousand regular army personnel 74 . So, the military decreased by approximately 45% (Table 3) ; although when determining margin numbers for the personnel, higher numbers were declared. It is important to point out that after the accession to NATO and abolition of the conception of the territorial defense, the downsizing of the NDVF was started. So, in 1991, the VNDS, the predecessor of the NDVF, had 7 320 and in 1995 it had 9 850 volunteers; in 1996, there were 127 companies and 34 battalions 75 . In 2014, 6 NDVF territorial units comprised 47 infantry companies 76 located throughout Lithuania and 4.4 thousand volunteers. Thus, the number of volunteers was cut more than twice and the companies were downsized nearly three times.
For example, in 2009, the NATO ally Norway had regular forces consisting of approximately 22 thousand servicemen and neutral Finland had correspondingly 30 thousand servicemen 77 ; consequently, about 0.45-0.6 % of the population served in the regular army. Using the method of analogy, the indicators of Lithuania should be 13.5-18 thousand, but the indicator for regular forces is similar only to that of volunteers. According to the MND data of 2014 renewed on February 14, the NDS comprised 7 790 PMS personnel, 199 cadets, 2 290 civilians, 4 215 volunteers and 77 persons who had undergone the basic military training 81% of all forces, while non-commissioned officers were 52.05% and 44.87%, respectively; the percentage of soldiers grew from 17.66% to 26.32%. According to the data of July 2012, there were 28% of officers, 44% of non-commissioned officers and 28% of soldiers. Nevertheless, we are seeking to have 24% of officers, 38% of non-commissioned officers and sergeants and 38% of soldiers in the Lithuanian Army in 2015. 81 . . On 8 July 2014, the margin numbers for the personnel of NDS servicemen and statute civil servants until 2020 were submitted to the Seimas where it was planned that in 2015, the margin numbers for the total NDS military personnel would be 14340-18460, whereas in 2020 it would be 15540-20260, including 8800-10600 PMS personnel (547-702 senior officers (9-12 generals and admirals, 30-40 colonels and navy captains, 129-150 lieutenant colonels and navy commanders, 379-500 navy lieutenant commanders)), 190-270 cadets, 1050-1590 BCMS soldiers, 4800-6300 AR personnel, 700-1500 soldiers of trained reserve participating in exercises and training sessions, 200-260 statute civil servants 83 . According to Minister J. Olekas, the priority for the nearest two years will be given to the provision of weapons, equipment, ammunition, clothing, and only afterwards it would be possible to plan a more considerable increase in personnel numbers. For 2015, slightly higher minimum (200) and maximum (1 100) limits were set concerning the number of NDS personnel as compared with the margin numbers for 2014 84 . Thus, comparing the 2013 plan for the forthcoming six years with the proposal put forward in 2014, negative changes in the planning policy regarding NDS personnel can be identified: 1) the minimum margin number for NDS personnel was cut by 3 230; 2) the minimum number of PMS personnel was also cut by 200; 3) the margin numbers for the BCMS were reduced; 4) the minimum number of AR personnel is reduced by 2 700 and the maximum number by 1 700; 5) it is planned to increase the number of senior officers again (it was up to 505, the proposed number being up to 702, i.e. 39%), though in previous years their number, and especially their percentage in the military, was planned to be reduced. The growth of the number of senior officers would be understandable if the total number of PMS personnel were increasing in an analogous way (in 2014, the PMS had 8 500 servicemen as compared with the maximum number for 2020, the increase being only 24.7%); however, with reference to the plans, it is not true. Comparing the minimum plans for 2020 with the factual situation in 2013, the PMS should increase by 1 025 (maximum 2 825) servicemen, and the BCMS by 416 (956) servicemen, the AR by 495 (1 995), while the total number of the personnel of all the three categories would increase by 2 570 (6 410), i.e. approximately by 21% (53%), and the financing for the NDS, following the 2014 agreement between parties, should increase by 2.5 times.
On 27 . Thus, there is a shortage of several thousand of professional servicemen alone in the army; therefore, the planned increase of the above-mentioned number of PMS personnel from 7.8 thousand to 10.6 thousand is well grounded and corresponds to the structure of NDS capabilities. Of course, positive assessment can be given to the decision implemented in 2014 regarding the formation of the national rapid reaction forces that consist of two battalion combat groups, including SOF, Air Force and other elements. Thus, from 1 November 2014, about 2.5 thousand personnel can promptly (within 2 to 24 hours) react to national security threats, including unconventional ones. However, these forces were formed by transferring servicemen from other battalions to the Grand Duke Algirdas Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the Grand Duchess Birutė Uhlan Battalion where, following the transfers, 800 servicemen serve in each 87 . And it is only in 2015 that the number of PMS personnel is planned to be increased by 450 with a major part of them distributed to Land Forces battalions 88 ; in 2016, it is planned to increase the number of newly admitted PMS military personnel by 350. But because until now the total number of PMS personnel admitted each year was 200-300 and the same number retired, in the future the total number 85 Ko trūktų Lietuvai karinės agresijos atveju? http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/ko-truktu-lietuvaikarines-agresijos-atveju.d?id=66521310, 28 11 2014. 86 Sausumos pajėgos, http://kariuomene.kam.lt/lt/kariuomenes_struktura/sausumos_pajegos.html, 27 11 2014. 87 Greitojo reagavimo pajėgų likimas -Seimo rankose", http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/karo-zona/ greitojo-reagavimo-pajegu-likimas-seimo-rankose-784-460902, 27 11 2014. 88 Krašto apsaugos ministras (note 32).
of the accepted servicemen is planned to be larger. Though some experts and politicians are for admitting additional 1 000 PMS military personnel as soon as 2015 89 . In 2002, it was planned that after completing the reform of the military in 2006, there would be 18 thousand servicemen and, in case of war, about 25 thousand reservists were planned to be called up 90 ; thus, approximately 43 thousand-man-strong forces were planned to be formed. In 2014, according to Maj. Gen. V. Žukas, the army would be able to fully equip 40-50 thousand persons 91 . Thus, plans for wartime strength capabilities have not changed over more than a decade. Besides, on the one hand, as it has already been mentioned, in 2014, the army will consist of only 8 thousand servicemen and 4 thousand volunteers and it is hard to imagine how these, approximately 12 thousand-man-strong forces could be rapidly increased by about 3.5 times when over two decades there has not been a single occasion when mobilization of at least one battalion or mobilization in any given district was not even attempted to be carried out. Although in 2014, the military command announced that in 2015, alongside military training, mobilization was going to be carried out in a selected region, in order to test the operation of the mobilization system 92 . On the other hand, in compliance with legal acts, persons are in the reserve until 55 or even 60 years of age, though it is hard to imagine combat units consisting of those who are in their fifties. Therefore, the practical age limit of reserve servicemen mobilized to combat units is nevertheless 35-45. 93 In this way, a person 18-25 years of age who completed the BMT (e.g. the average age of the 51 participants of the first BMT who took the oath on 28 October 2011 was 22 the participants of the BMT choose it due to the prospects offered by PMS 96 ), belong to the LRU 97 or be in the reserve, thus ensuring that the NDS would have about 60-68 thousand servicemen of the 1 st and 2 nd preparedness reserve groups (1/4-1/3 of them would serve in NDS units). In case of war, with servicemen belonging to the 1 st preparedness reserve group for about 10 years and in the absence of massive emigration of young reservists, the above-mentioned 43 thousand-man-strong force (according to the plans for 2002, with the emphasis on territorial defense) could be formed of persons of up to 35 years of age. On 28 November 2014, when problems of national defense were discussed in the NSDC of the Seimas, Gen. Maj. J. V. Žukas pointed out that the army would be content with a ratio of 1:3 between the serving personnel and those in the reserve, e.g. if there were 12 thousand servicemen, the reserve should consist of 36 thousand personnel, if there were 15.5-20.3 thousand (these margin numbers were approved by the NDS for 2020), then the reserve should be 46.5-60.9 thousand. With the abolition of conscription, difficulties may arise in the future in ensuring the above-mentioned numbers of trained reservists.
In the opposite case, following the theoretical assumption that a trained reservist is suited for formation service for approximately 20 years, in the near future, in planning defense of Lithuania, the NDS is going to face a serious problem of a shortage of trained reserve. By around 2024, all men that until 2007 had been called up for the compulsory military service will be already over 35, so the number of the reservists of the 1 st preparedness group (trained in 2008-2024 98 ), with existing relevancy of training in Lithuania, will reach about 25 thousand (the major part of them will serve in the NDS), whereas the number of the 2 nd preparedness reserve group will make up about 35 thousand 99 ; however, one has to question the possibilities of, say, mobilizing all the women who completed the BMT 10 or 15 years ago.
In 2008, when planning the transition to the PMS, arguments were put forward that if contracts were concluded for 4 years and, upon expiration of this term, 80% of the personnel were dismissed and 20% continued their service, in "10 years' time, it would be feasible to have 7 000 individual reserve servicemen capable of leading 70 000 untrained citizens", i.e. in case of crisis, to lead squads 100 . It seems, though, that this argument was not quite substantiated. However, the idea of servicemen who, in case of mobilization, can serve as noncommissioned officers or even junior officers is not new; this was the idea that after WWII had been entertained by the Reichswehr, the German Army, which after the Peace Treaty of Versailles was reduced to 100 thousand personnel. In fact, in the 40s of the 20 th century, this idea led to excellent results when Germany was boosting its forces, but it took the Germans not a few days or weeks but several years. Besides, those professional servicemen did not have to go to war to lead a squad of "untrained citizens". It may be noted that in 2014, in Lithuania, both the military command and rightwing politicians as well as political and defense analysts already started discussions about the restoration of the compulsory military service by giving as an example other NATO countries-Norway, Estonia, and Greece all still have conscription. The issue of conscription will be extremely urgent if, with an increase of PMS personnel, there will be an insufficient number of volunteers willing to conclude 4-year contracts. But, Article 139 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which states that "The defense of the State of Lithuania against a foreign armed attack shall be the right and duty of each citizen of the Republic of Lithuania. Citizens of the Republic of Lithuania must perform military and alternative national defense service according to the procedure established by law", is still in force.
Conclusions
For over two decades financing for the NDS has not been a priority, and a number of commitments and agreements to allocate 2% of the GDP had a merely declarative character and usually remained unimplemented. One can also discern an "occasional" increase in the financing for defense when Lithuania was seeking NATO membership; having achieved the goal, the portion of the GDP allocated for defense started decreasing as early as 2004 already and this process continued for nearly 10 years. This undoubtedly had a negative impact on the strengthening of the power of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The latter circumstance, of course, does not go unnoticed by other NATO countries and inevitably raises doubts concerning the determination of the State of Lithuania to defend itself; thus permanent and unimplemented political agreements and commitments to increase the financing for defense up to 2% in a long-term perspective should be considered a serious threat to national security.
Negative changes that occurred in 2013-2014 in NDS personnel planning policy for the period until 2019-2020, while reducing margin numbers for soldiers and increasing those for senior officers, could be justifiable for a certain period of time if a major portion of assignations for defense is in the future allocated for the procurement of armaments and other military assets because training of professional officers takes decades, procurement of new armaments 2-3 years or even longer, and if a system is new, its introduction requires still more time; meanwhile, reserve servicemen may be trained in half a year or a year if there are trained noncommissioned officers and officers available for the job. Besides, in case of mobilization or war, training of reservists makes sense if the NDS is able to arm them and has at its disposal ammunition, equipment and other military assets.
The current military units, with the exception of the two battalions of rapid reaction forces formed in 2014, are not at optimum strength, and this is identified as a problem by the military command. Although in the future it is planned to test the army mobilization system by carrying out mobilization in a selected region, so far it may be stated that plans that could practically enable prompt mobilization of the required number of reservists in order to form the planned 40-50 thousand-man-strong forces have not yet been put to the test in the Lithuanian Army. In case of emergency, an increase of the forces by four times from the current 12 thousand to the above-mentioned 40-50 thousand by calling up 28-38 thousand reservists, would have to be based on merely theoretical assumptions and plans rather than practical experience of mobilization trainings.
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